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Chapter 3 
Cognitive Choice Processes and the 
Attitude-Behavior Relation 
Dietrich Albert, K Michael Aschenbrenner, and 
Franz Schmalhofer 
Fishbein and Ajzerfs (1975) theory of reasoned action is currently the most 
successful and much discussed theory in attitude-behavior research. A l -
though the theory is well established for predicting behavior in various con-
texts, its central assumption of a static attitude-behavior intention relation 
appears questionable when recent results of cognitively oriented decision 
research are considered. This assumption is dynamically reformulated in 
order to model the cognitive processes in binary choice. The resulting 
criterion-dependent choice models assume a sequential evaluative process-
ing of the alternatives' attributes until enough evidence in favor of one alter-
native is accumulated. Wi th in this general framework, specific models dis-
tinguish between internally (memory) and externally (display) available 
information about the alternatives. The models and a series of experimental 
studies, which were specifically designed to investigate various aspects of the 
models, are comprehensively presented. Relations to other theories and con-
sequences for attitude-behavior research are discussed. 
Fishbein and Ajzen's Contribution to the 
Attitude-Behavior Problem 
According to Stroebe (1980, p. 138), at the start of the 1970s social psychology 
went through a difficult period because of the attitude-behavior inconsisten-
cies. The resolution of this crisis is credited in particular to the efforts of F ish-
bein and Ajzen. By means of their principle of correspondence (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1977; Fishbein, 1973; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974), they ordered the 
heterogeneous findings (e.g., Wicker, 1969) on the attitude-behavior relation 
which caused this crisis. 
Further, they made a successful proposal on how behavior depends on at-
titudes. This was done in their theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), which was recently extended into the theory 
of planned action (Ajzen, 1985). 
Their theory's central assumptions regarding the effects of attitudes are em-
bodied in two equations (see equations (1) and (2); Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 
301). 
B ~ I = (AB)w + other variable(s), (1) 
where B = the behavior in question, 
/ = the person's intention to perform behavior B, 
AB = the attitude (evaluation) toward performing behavior 
w = a regression weight. 
According to Fishbein (1963, 1967), the attitude formation is concep-
tualized as an expectancy times value model or—more generally—as a 
bilinear model. 
(2) 
i = 1 
where 6, = the strength of the salient belief (subjective probability) held 
by a person that performing behavior B leads to outcome i 
("outcome" includes consequences, effort, costs, characteris-
tics and other attributes); 
e, = the evaluation (attitude) of outcome i ; 
n = the number of salient beliefs the person actually holds regard-
ing performing behavior B. 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) present their model as a process model in the 
sense of a causal chain, in which the '"salient beliefs are the immediate deter-
minants of the person's attitude" (p. 63). This attitude is one of the ante-
cedents of the intention that is the immediate determinant of the behavioral 
act. However, their theory has only been tested by regression methods and 
correlational statistics. According to the principle of correspondence the 
values /, Ah, b, and e are elicited by individual-rating procedures. However, 
the beliefs used are those salient i n a given population (the so-called modal 
salient beliefs) or the first few beliefs (five to nine) of an individual , which in 
both cases are elicited by a free response task (continuous association). Thus 
Ajzen and Fishbein did not solve the problem of determining the salient 
beliefs a person actually holds. One possibility is to ask a person for his 
beliefs after the formation of his intention, as by Westhoff (Chapter 8, this 
volume). Other possibilities for solving the problem, by specific methods of 
observation or by the application of process models, are presented i n the two 
sections after the next one. 
The Theory of Reasoned Action, A Process Model? 
Discussing the theory of reasoned action (and its derivatives not mentioned 
here) is difficult because of Fishbein and Ajzen's intention-behavior gap. 
They intend to consider salient beliefs ("in order to predict a person's at-
titude, it is not sufficient to know what information he has been given; rather 
it is necessary to assess the beliefs he actually holds, i.e. his salient beliefs." 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 233; " in order to understand why a person holds a 
certain attitude toward an object it is necessary to assess his salient beliefs 
about that object." Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p. 63), but in actuality they do not: 
"It appears impossible to obtain a precise measure of the beliefs that deter-
mine an individual's attitude since the number of salient beliefs may vary 
from person to person" (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 219). They intend to test a 
process model of the attitude-behavior relation ("we are again advocating an 
approach which explicates the processes intervening between stimulus and 
response variables," p. 334), but they investigate a regression model (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980, pp. 98-100). The question of which part of their theory was to 
be discussed had to be decided. We decided to discuss that part of the theory 
which applied to data, because Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) refer to this part 
when they conclude that "some people may arrive at their decisions in dif-
ferent ways. The accumulating evidence suggests, however, that the theory is 
useful for most individuals and with respect to most social behaviors" (p. 
245). 
Their theory is an excellent contribution to the prediction of behavior. 
However, we disagree with its use "as a description of human information 
processing" (p. 245) for the following reasons: 
1. The predictability of a more or less specific behavior-intention judgment 
from attitudinal and subjective-norm judgments by means of a linear 
model (equation 1) does not prove that behavioral attitudes control 
behavioral intentions (cf. Birnbaum, 1973; Dawes, 1979; Dawes & Cor-
rigan, 1974; Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979). 
2. The predictability of a behavior-attitude judgment from evaluative and 
belief-strength judgments by a bilinear model (equation 2) does not prove 
that these variables control attitudinal judgments in that way (Busemeyer 
& Jones, 1983; Thorngate, 1980). 
3. It appears doubtful that the variable "belief strength" played any role at 
all in the behavioral intentions or attitude formations that were inves-
tigated by Fishbein and Ajzen. The variance-explaining effect of this vari-
able may have been an artifact of the methods used (cf. Cronen & C o n -
ville, 1975; Del ia , Crockett, Press, & O'Keefe, 1975). 
O f course, arguments 1 through 3 do not exclude the possibility that some 
behavioral intentions are determined by a holistic attitude (equation 1), and 
that some holistic attitudes evolve according to the bilinear model (equation 
2). However, it is doubtful that this is very often the case for the following 
reason, which is our main argument: 
4. Detailed analyses of decision and choice behavior have shown that (a) 
behavior is often determined by heuristic processing of individual at-
tributes of objects that does not result i n holistic evaluations of these ob-
jects (e.g., Russo & Dosher, 1983), (b) holistic judgments are often deter-
mined by heuristics that are incompatible with a bilinear model (e.g., 
Schoemaker, 1979), (c) judgmental and choice processes often differ 
(Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971) i n such ways that the first cannot be part of 
the second, and (d) especially expectancy times value models cannot ex-
plain choice behavior (Aschenbrenner, 1984, 1985). 
The results of cognitive decision research suggest a modification and an 
extension of the processing part of Fishbein and Ajzen's theory. The 
methods that were developed and used in cognitive decision research (cf. 
Aschenbrenner, 1979) allow additional insights into the processes that pre-
cede behavioral choice. Analyzing these processes is exactly what Fishbein 
and Ajzen originally intended to do. 
Principles for Analyzing Cognitive Choice Processes 
O n a global level of theorizing, agreement can be made with Ajzen and F ish-
bein (1980, p. 41) "that all behavior involves a choice, be it a choice between 
performing or not performing a given action or a choice among several 
qualitatively or quantitatively different action alternatives." Thus it appears 
natural that the process components that were postulated by Fishbein and 
Ajzen are easily assigned to the states of a choice process. 
O n the basis of cognitive choice research the components of a choice pro-
cess may be summarized: (1) becoming aware of a decision problem and/or 
realizing an (unsatisfied) behavioral objective; (2) selecting information 
about features of potential behavioral alternatives with respect to situation 
and objective; (3) evaluating the selected information with respect to situa-
tion and/or objective and aggregating these evaluations; (4) termination of 
information selection, evaluation, aggregation, and finally choice of behavior. 
Wi th in this framework, predicting and describing individual choice may 
fail for the following reasons (most of the following principles are also i n ac-
cordance with the theory of reasoned action, thus demonstrating that a con-
vergence between attitude and choice research has also been reached on an 
empirical level): 
1. A person may perceive the situation differently or may pursue different 
objectives than those assumed by the experimenter. In our experiments 
situations and objectives wi l l be prescribed by instruction. 
2. A person may consider other behavioral alternatives than those assumed 
by the experimenter. Hence we wil l inquire about potential behavioral 
alternatives or define the set of alternatives. 
3. A person may select other information about the alternatives than the ex-
perimenter assumes. Consequently, we wil l inquire about the alternatives' 
features, define the features, or make the selection process observable. 
4. A person may evaluate the alternatives' features differently than the ex-
perimenter. Therefore, we wil l inquire about the evaluations or pre-
scribe them. 
5. A person may aggregate the component judgments differently than the 
experimenter assumes. Hence we wil l test specific predictions of our 
favorite aggregation rule and consider other rules additionally. 
6. Before terminating the choice process a person may process a different 
amount of information than the experimenter assumes. Therefore, we wil l 
observe the latency of decision as well as the processed information— 
whenever possible. 
We tried not only to consider these principles as guidelines for our empiri-
cal proceeding; but also attempted to capture their aspects of selectivity, flex-
ibility, and adaptivity in the development of our theoretical framework; the 
so-called criterion-dependent choice ( C D C ) models. 
General Method of Empirical Investigation 
Typically our studies consisted of two kinds of tasks: choice tasks and 
evaluation tasks. The order of these sections was varied. N o systematic effect 
of this variation was observed. 
The Choice Tasks 
So far, our research considered choices between two alternatives at a time, 
that is, binary choices. Subjects were instructed to imagine a choice situation 
(according to principle 1). For example, choosing journal subscriptions 
which are offered as a birthday present. A choice pair was then presented 
and the subjects had to decide which of the two alternatives they would 
choose. Thus hypothetical choice intentions were elicited in a given im-
agined situation. This was usually repeated with al l n(n — l)/2 pairs from a 
predefined set of n (usually n = 6 or n = 9) alternatives. Not the alternatives 
themselves, but symbolic representations of—with only few exceptions— 
actually existing alternatives were used in the experiments. 
In order to account for the fact that alternatives may be represented in dif-
ferent ways, and that choice processes may depend on differences in rep-
resentation (Payne, 1982), two different methods of presenting alternatives 
were used. The two alternatives of a pair were presented either by their names 
(named presentation), by lists of their characteristic features without names 
(described presentation), or both. The features were organized in a dimen-
sional fashion, that is, i f price was a dimension the prices of both alternatives 
were given. In a named condition, for example, the names of two German 
magazines (e.g., Capital and Spiegel), were presented in one line at the left and 
right side on a computer screen. In a described condition, the lists of features 
of the two alternatives were presented next to each other on the left and right 
side ordered by dimensions. The dimensions' names (e.g. price) were also 
given (cf. Table 3-1). Most of the experiments used 11 dimensions to describe 
the alternatives; descriptively informative rather than evaluative dimensions 
Table 3-1. Sample Choice Pairsb in Named and Described Presentation Mode 
Journal Subscriptions 
Named presentation Capital Spiegel 
Described presentation 
Frequency of publication Monthly Weekly 
Number of articles on science 4 1 
Number of advertisements 120 180 
Price of magazine 6. D M a 4. D M a 
Number of articles on politics 70 25 
Number of articles on ecology 1 5 
Number of articles on entertainment 5 3 
Number of articles on cultural events 3 5 
Number of pictures 15 15 
Number of color pictures 10 3 
Number of pages in magazine 350 300 
Vacation Areas 
Named presentation Siena, Toscany Neusiedel am 
See, Austria 
Described presentation 
Vegetation Lush Lush 
Rainy days 2 15 
Temperature (C) 29 20 
Leisure activities Abundant Average 
Purchasing power of deutschmark 1.17 0.86 
Landscape Hilly Mountains 
Location Inland Lakeshore 
Historical sites Many Few 
Popularity Popular Very popular 
German spoken Occasionally Always 
Distance from Heidelberg 900 km 1700 km 
a D M = deutschmark. 
translations. 
were used as well as features, which were only presented in evaluative form 
in some specific experiments. 
Usually, the alternatives were presented on a computer videoscreen. In 
some experiments described alternatives were presented by an information 
display board which init ially showed only the dimensions' names. The alter-
natives' features on the dimensions had to be uncovered sequentially by 
opening small doors. 
Various choice domains were used, that is, vacation areas, journal sub-
scriptions, car rentals, university towns, and board games. Most studies used 
alternatives that were selected from among existing alternatives. In general, 
sets of alternatives were collected in such a way that decision conflicts were 
expected for the subjects for at least some pairs of alternatives. In two earlier 
studies (Aschenbrenner, Albert, & Schmalhofer, 1984; Schmalhofer, Aschen-
brenner, Albert & Gertzen (submitted), experiment 1), alternatives that were 
individually elicited from the subjects themselves (according to principles 2 
and 3) were used. In these experiments the subjects also generated dimen-
sions and the alternatives' features on the dimensions for those alternatives 
that were used for described presentation. However, systematic differences 
between experimenter and subject generated alternatives and descriptions 
were found neither between nor within the subjects. Therefore, because of 
the subjects' difficulties i n constructing alternatives' descriptions, only 
experimenter-generated alternatives were used i n later studies. 
In addition to the chosen alternatives, choice latencies and/or the dimen-
sions that were inspected by the subjects were also observed as dependent 
variables. In some studies the subjects were also instructed to think aloud 
during their choices. 
The Evaluation Tasks 
Some researchers (cf. Six, 1980; Upmeyer, 1982) argue that a high attitude-
behavior consistency is trivially found i f the situations for attitude assess-
ment and for behavior observation are identical. We disagree with this argu-
ment. F rom a decision-theoretical point of view evaluations have to be 
assessed with respect to the same situation and objectives as the one in which 
choices are made, i f the former shall predict the latter. For example, the same 
ingredients of some food may be evaluated completely differently by the 
same person when the person is on a diet as compared to his regular eating 
behavior. Therefore, the subjects had to imagine the same choice situation 
during the evaluation sequence. Consequently, they were asked to evaluate 
the attractiveness of the alternatives' features with respect to their objectives 
in the given choice situation. For example, they were asked, "Consider the 
dimension landscape' of your next summer vacation spot. H o w attractive 
would be the feature 'h i l ly?" These evaluations were done on 7-point rating 
scales with the extreme points 1 and 7 being labeled "unattractive" and "very 
attractive." 
For alternatives used for named presentation the alternatives' features 
were elicited individually before evaluation by a free-association procedure. 
Subjects were asked, for example: "If you think about Ajaccio on Corse as a 
place for your summer vacation, what comes to mind? " The associations and 
their time sequence were recorded individually. After the subjects as-
sociations had been elicited for all the alternatives that were presented in the 
choice tasks, the subjects evaluated their associations by the same procedure 
as used for the features of the described alternatives. The attractiveness 
ratings were usually elicited by a microcomputer for one feature at a time. 
Subjects also evaluated the importance of the dimensions on which the 
alternatives were described in the described conditions. Subjects were asked, 
for example: " H o w important is the following dimension for you when 
choosing a place for summer vacation: landscape." In earlier experiments a 
7-point rating scale and procedure was used. The poles of the rating scale 
were labeled "unimportant" and "very important". More recent studies used 
a magnitude estimation procedure for eliciting dimensional importance i n 
which the subjects first rank ordered the dimensions of a choice topic and 
then indicated how much more important each dimension was as compared 
to the least important dimension. 
Thus the following variables were available for predicting individual 
choices: feature-attractiveness ratings, dimension-importance values for des-
cribed alternatives, and association-sequences and their time characteristics 
for named alternatives. In some studies further variables were assessed for 
predicting the choices, that is, the inspected dimensions, their order and their 
number. 
One may hypothesize that our variables "attractiveness" and "importance" 
correspond respectively to Fishbein and Ajzen's predictors "evaluation" and 
"belief strength." For the first variables the correspondence is self-evident. 
However, importance and belief strength are not interchangeable ex-
pressions. Whereas belief strength is the extent to which a person is convin-
ced that an alternative has a certain feature, the importance of a dimension is 
assumed to increase with the degree of uncertainty about the features con-
stituting the dimension; that is, importance is considered a measure of the 
expected amount of choice relevant information that is obtained by learning 
an alternative's feature on the dimension. Further, attractiveness plays a role 
similar to that of evaluation i n Fishbein and Ajzen's models, whereas the 
role of importance (in our models) is completely different from that of 
belief strength. 
Criterion-Dependent Choice Models 
The C D C models postulate a sequential evaluation process that results i n an 
intention to choose one of two alternatives when enough evidence has been 
accumulated to be sure that this alternative is better than the other with re-
spect to the situation and objectives. This does not require that all available 
information has been processed. The moving force of this process is lack of 
evidence or doubt about the superiority of the currently preferred alternative. 
Wi th in the framework for cognitive choice processes previously mentioned, 
the following more specific assumptions are made. They apply to both 
named and described alternatives. 
Information Selection 
It is due to the narrowness of consciousness (Mi i l le r & Pilzecker, 1900, p. 79) 
that information abut potential choice alternatives are processed sequen-
tially, that is, their cognitively represented features. The features of named 
alternatives are internal, for example, knowledge or memory based; thus 
their processing sequence is the sequence of their retrieval. These retrieval 
sequences may depend not only on the presented names but also on the 
choice situation, the person's objectives, and so forth. To model this retrieval 
process is not aspired by the C D C models since models of retrieval from 
memory are already available (e.g., Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Strube, 
1984); they can be adapted to and incorporated into the C D C models (Ktihn, 
Schmalhofer, Albert, & Aschenbrenner, 1986). 
The features of described alternatives are by definition externally pre-
sented—in our experiments, i n the specific dimensional presentation mode. 
These features are assumed to be processed i n pairs, that is, the features of 
the two alternatives on one dimension at a time. The processing sequence is 
assumed to depend on the additionally given dimension names. More pre-
cisely, it is assumed that the sequence depends on the importance of the 
dimensions with respect to the choice problem. A t least probabilistically, im-
portant dimensions are assumed to be processed earlier than less im-
portant dimensions. 
Other assumptions about the sequential selection of dimensions of de-
scribed alternatives may also be introduced into C D C models. Fo r example, 
one may assume that reading habits influence the sequence; or, i f some in -
formation is more accessible than other information, salience and avail-
ability may play some role. 
In light of Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) discussion o f the importance of 
features as a predictor of behavior, the assumption of processing by impor-
tance appears interesting enough for empirical study. Note, however, that we 
consider importance of dimensions, that is, feature classes, and not impor-
tance of individual features as Fishbein and Ajzen do. Furthermore, in the 
C D C models importance may direct the sequence of information processing; 
importance is not considered a multiplicative weighting factor for evaluations. 
Evaluation and Aggregation 
The core of every attitude-behavior model consists of assumptions regarding 
evaluation and aggregation. It is not that the other components of the process 
are less important for modeling, but they are less typical for the behavior in 
question. Assumptions about selecting information and terminating infor-
mation processing may be found in models for almost any behavior (e.g., let-
ter identification or aimed movements). Evaluative and aggregating com-
ponents may also be found in processes of the latter type. But these 
components are usually not of the same k ind as is typical for attitude-
behavior and choice research; namely evaluations of the l ike-disl ike, good-
bad, or attractive-unattractive kind. 
Such an evaluation is assumed to take place sequentially dependent on the 
processed features. Every new feature or feature pair that is processed is 
assumed to be evaluated, and these evaluations are assumed to be ac-
cumulated. Evaluations may be absolute or comparative depending on 
whether an individual feature (named presentation) or a feature pair (dimen-
sionally described presentation) is processed. It is not assumed that the 
resulting evaluation depends solely on the processed feature or features as a 
somewhat stable value or association. Rather, evaluations may vary with the 
respective situation and the subject's objectives. To our knowledge such an 
evaluation process has not yet been satisfactorily modeled. W h i c h is why we 
inquire about the evaluations and stress the identity of situations for eliciting 
choices and evaluations. 
Each evaluation is assumed to be aggregated to the results of prior 
evaluations during the choice process. Depending on which alternative is 
favored by an evaluation, the aggregated evaluation is changed toward that 
alternative. Nevertheless, the aggregated evaluation may still favor the other 
alternative. If the currently evaluated features do not favor any alternative, 
the aggregated evaluation remains unchanged in that processing step. If the 
person has no bias for one of the alternatives (e.g., left or right bias) the proc-
ess begins with a neutral evaluation. 
Termination and Choice 
Sequential information selection, evaluation, and aggregation are assumed 
to stop when the aggregated evaluation reaches or exceeds one of two critical 
values, one for each alternative. The alternative whose critical value has been 
reached is chosen. The size of the critical value corresponds to the amount of 
evidence or accumulated attractiveness difference which is necessary in 
order to be certain that one alternative is the better one, although some infor-
mation has not been processed. We still assume that the size of the critical 
value does not depend on the particular choice alternatives but on charac-
teristics of the situation, the subject, or other constraints such as choice 
quality, time pressure, and so forth. Although effects of such parameters on 
the direction of changes of the critical value are easy to imagine, a precise 
formulation of the dependence requires further research. 
In this context behavioral choice means that at the time of terminating the 
process, and under the given circumstances, a person would intend to realize 
the chosen alternative. However, it may happen that the (internally or exter-
nally) available information is not sufficient for exceeding one or the other 
critical value. In particular this may occur for similar alternatives or for 
high critical values. In this case several alternative possibilities are available, 
for example, searching for further information, repeated processing of the in -
formation using other heuristics, choosing at random, or concluding that the 
critical value was too high and deciding on the basis of a smaller evaluative 
difference. The latter rule was applied to our data because it seemed to be the 
most rational and simple in a forced-choice situation, and it coincides with 
the evidence interpretation of the critical values: i f all information has been 
processed, instead of an evidence criterion the "exact" attractiveness dif-
ference may be used for making a decision. 
Summing up our main theoretical assumptions in a more formal way, 
Figure 3-1(a) presents a flow diagram of the C D C models for named and des-
cribed alternatives, Figure 3-1(b) illustrates the process model for the choice 
between dimensionally described alternatives, and Figure 3-1(c) is an illus-
tration of the assumed process for the choice between named alternatives. 
The common characteristics of the C D C models are sequential-
information processing and criterion-dependent termination of the choice 
process. Specific characteristics, for example, the way in which features are 
evaluated and aggregated or the number of features (one or two) that are pro-
cessed in one step, may differ between the models. Furthermore, the se-
quence of processing features may be constant or may vary probabilistically. 
These and other differences between the specific models are all compatible 
with these general assumptions. The main reasons for designing this class of 
models are: 
1. The C D C models incorporate a number of well-known choice heuristics 
(cf. Svenson, 1979) and allow the development of stochastic versions. For 
example, with an ordinal-scale level for the evaluations and with features 
being processed in pairs, the lexicographic rule is obtained i f the critical 
value is set to one; with large critical value the majority rule is ap-
proached. 
2. The assumption of criterion dependence continues a tradition of decision 
models (Audley, 1963; Audley & Pike, 1965; Bower, 1959; Estes, 1959) that 
have been discussed and successfully applied in perception (e.g., for dis-
crimination decisions; L ink , 1978; L i n k & Heath, 1975) and memory 
research (e.g., for recognition decisions; Ratcliff, 1978), since the begin-
ning of the 1960s; in probability theory related models (e.g., random walk 
models, sequential sampling models; see Feller, 1957; W a l d 1950) are even 
older. In contrast to these models is the C D C models' assumption that 
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Figure 3-1(a) Flow diagram of the C D C model for named and described alternatives. 
Z is the counter, k is the critical value, i is the number of the processing step. For 
named alternatives: ah a 2 , . . . , a,-,..., an is a sequence of features./(a,) is 1 if a, is a fea-
ture of alternative X, and - / i f a, is a feature of alternative Y. For described alter-
natives: Xj andjv are the features of X and Y on the zth dimension, v (.) is a feature's 
evaluation with values between —3 and +3. (b) Illustrative example of a C D C choice 
process between two described alternatives, (c) Illustrative example of a C D C choice 
process between two named alternatives. 
every feature of each alternative or at least its evaluation is processed only 
once, that is, no replacement is assumed. This complicates the formal 
mathematical analysis of the models. 
Recently, the tradition of criterion dependence of decisions has been 
continued by Busemeyer (1982, 1985), Wallsten (1980), and Wallsten and 
Barton (1982) for described stimuli. Wallsten predicted probabilistic i n -
ference decisions with this k ind of model; Busemeyer s subjects had to 
choose between a reliable and a risky alternative. The empirical findings 
of these studies are encouraging; thus—together with the previously men-
tioned incorporation of well-known choice heuristics—the criterion 
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Figure 3-1. (Continued) 
dependence principle may help to unify theorizing in choice and decision 
research, as well as attitude-behavior research. 
3. The C D C models allow for systematic (through experimental manipula-
tion) as well as unsystematic (through probabilistic fluctuation) variation 
of choices and choice latencies. Such variation may have the following 
causes: systematic or unsystematic variation of the sequence of processing 
features, the critical value, the attractiveness values, or the starting value 
for the aggregation of evaluations. 
4. As a consequence of systematic variations the C D C models allow for 
modeling different effort-quality trade-offs by manipulating the size of 
the critical values (Schmalhofer, 1987; Schmalhofer & Saffrich, 1984). 
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Figure 3-1. (Continued) 
5. The C D C models capture the well-known context dependency of choices 
(Payne, 1982),that is, the dependence of the chosen alternative on the con-
text of the other alternatives. This effect is responsible for not allowing 
simple scaling of choice alternatives. 
6. The C D C models describe the oscillation between choice alternatives 
known from experience in which one's temporary preference vascillates 
from one alternative to the other during the choice process. Likewise, the 
C D C models may describe the unequivocal preference of one alternative 
following a relatively fast choice process. 
7. The C D C models are in line with the attitude-behavior models in the 
Fishbein and Ajzen tradition; although we would like to assert that at 
least for binary choice the cognitive processes are described more ade-
quately by the C D C models, since they modify and extend the processing 
part of Fishbein and Ajzen's theory. 
By making the choice dependent on reaching a criterion (instead of sum-
ming up n evaluations), and by introducing assumptions about the sequence 
of information processing, Fishbein and Ajzen's problem of using exactly 
those beliefs that are salient is solved. 
Empirical Results 
Even though the discussed aspects seem to be desirable theoretical reasons 
for designing C D C models, there is still a need to provide empirical support 
for them. The following studies wi l l be organized by the three components of 
the C D C models: information selection, evaluation and aggregation, and ter-
mination by a choice. 
Implications of specific C D C models were empirically tested in a series of 
experiments and quasiexperiments. Usually each investigation focused on 
specific aspects of some C D C model. Therefore, results from various studies 
wi l l be organized i n such a way that they refer to the previously mentioned 
three components of the C D C models. 
Pr ior to this presentation, we would like to say a few words about global 
measures of model fit, such as number of correct predictions. A good overall 
fit provides only restricted evidence for the validity of a model (cf. the critical 
comments previously discussed regarding Fishbein and Ajzen's empirical 
procedures). G o o d overall fit is, however, a high incentive for more specific 
tests of a model. Table 3-2 displays the relative frequencies of correctly pre-
dicted choices that were obtained in various studies which used named as 
well as described presentation of alternatives. In each case, the choices were 
predicted individually by the respective C D C model variant and by means of 
the following parameters: attractiveness judgments, sequences of associated 
features to named alternatives, and importance judgments or observed se-
quences of inspected dimensions for described alternatives. The critical 
value was estimated as a free parameter from the choice data individually for 
each subject and choice topic. That is, one critical value was used for all 
Table 3-2. Relative Frequencies of Correctly Predicted Choices 
Named Described 
Alternatives Alternatives 
Schmalhofer et al. (1986) 
.83b 
Schmalhofer et al. (submitted) 
Experiment 1 .73 (.65)d .83 (.78) 
Experiment 2 — .80° (.74) 
Experiment 3 .78c (.76) — 
aPredicted by the most extreme countervalue without a critical value. 
bPredicted by sign of the last countervalue without a critical value. 
cAveraged over two salience conditions. 
dIn parantheses the frequencies with critical values estimated independently. 
choices of a subject from a set of alternatives. In some cases, the critical value 
was estimated to maximize the number of correct predictions for a subject. In 
other cases, only part of the choices was used to estimate the critical value 
which was then used to predict the other choices. 
Overall, the model fit appears satisfactory, although it is generally some-
what lower for named alternatives than for described ones. Also , as expected, 
the fit is somewhat lower but still satisfying i f the critical value is estimated 
independently. It should be noted, however, that model fits being accom-
plished by the traditional additive model (i.e., by adding the attractiveness 
values of all features of each alternative and choosing the alternative with the 
higher sum of values) are in the same range (see the section on comparison 
with other models). Thus these global results not only suggest but also re-
quire more specific tests that wi l l be discussed in the following sections. 
Information Selection 
Information concerning choice alternatives may be represented internally in 
the memory of a person (when the name of an alternative is presented) or ex-
ternally (when a description of an alternative is given) or both (in a shop pro-
ducts do often have their names as well as some descriptive information 
printed on the package). In our studies, alternatives were presented either by 
name only or by lists of features organized by dimensions without names, 
or both. 
For named alternatives we assume that individual features of the alter-
natives are processed in their order of recall, that is, in the order in which 
they come to the subject's mind. For described alternatives we assume that 
features are processed in pairs in the order of the dimensions importance. 
These assumptions were supported by think-aloud protocols from 20 sub-
jects who had to choose between named as well as described alternatives in a 
balanced order (Schmalhofer & Schafer, 1986). Examples of protocol ex-
cerpts from vacation choices indicating single feature processing are: "12 
rainy days is rather bad, isn't it?"; "very hot weather." Examples indicating 
processing in pairs are: "temperature is rather cool there, hot here"; "well, I'd 
prefer warm to hot and humid weather." As expected, single-feature process-
ing occurred significantly more often with choices between named alter-
natives, whereas pairwise processing prevailed with dimensionally de-
scribed alternatives (see Table 3-3). 
For further testing of assumptions about processing order, twenty-four 
subjects had to choose among the same alternatives presented once by name 
and once by description. Also, both free associations to the alternatives' 
names and judgments of the importance of the dimensions used for describ-
ing the alternatives were elicited. Although we do not consider an overall 
model fit very informative on an absolute level, it should be sensitive as a 
relative measure for comparing different processing assumptions. Thus we 
predicted the choices under both presentations by both processing assump-
tions. As expected, the choices between named alternatives were better pre-
Table 3-3. Frequency of Occurrence of Utterances Referring to Individual 
Features and of Utterances Referring to Pairs of Features on a Dimension 
(e.g., Comparisons) in Think Aloud Protocols 
Choice Pair 
Sequence Object Named Described 
n = 160 n = 577 
Named-described choices Feature 43.65% 29.64% 
Dimension 8.10% 31.54% 
n = 212 n = 646 
Described-named choices Feature 44.34% 25.55% 
Dimension 8.02% 39.02% 
From Schmalhofer & Schafer (1986), with permission. 
dieted when the processing orders were assumed to be identical to the sub-
jects' retrieval sequences than when the processing of feature pairs was 
assumed to be i n the order of dimensional importance. For described alter-
natives, the opposite result was obtained (see Table 3-4). 
The results reported thus far were obtained under the assumption of con-
stant processing orders within subjects. For described alternatives it was 
assumed that a subject processed the feature pairs in the same order for all 
pairs of alternatives. On ly the number of feature pairs could vary between 
choice pairs because the attractiveness differences on the dimensions deter-
mine how fast one of the criteria is reached. Similarly, the same feature re-
trieval order that was obtained for a named alternative by free association 
was assumed to occur every time when that alternative was presented in a 
choice pair independently of the other alternative in the pair. 
One reason for questioning this simplifying assumption is that subjects do 
not always choose the same alternative when presented with the same pair of 
alternatives repeatedly (e.g., Petrusic & Jamieson, 1978). This was also ob-
served in our studies. For example, when subjects had to choose between the 
Table 3-4. Percentage of Correct Predictions of Choices Between Named and 
Described Alternatives by Either C D C Model 
Choice Between 
C D C Models Named Alternatives Described Alternatives 
Named alternatives 73% 68% 
Described alternatives 69% 83% 
From Schmalhofer, Aschenbrenner, Albert, & Gertzen (submitted). 
same alternatives twice with a retest interval of about one week, the average 
percentage of identical choices over two conditions in the two sessions was 
0.86% for named and 0.85% for described alternatives (Schmalhofer, Aschen-
brenner, Albert, & Gertzen, submitted). In light of this reliability of choices, 
the average goodness of fit of about 80% correct predictions previously re-
ported can be regarded as very good. 
The C D C models can account for this fluctuation in choices in a number 
of ways. The attractiveness evaluations of the features may fluctuate (Thur-
stone, 1927), the critical value may fluctuate, and finally the order of process-
ing may vary. The latter aspect of varying processing sequences is new and 
distinguishes the C D C models from other choice models. Since the C D C 
models assume that only parts of the available information are processed 
until a criterion is reached, different processing orders may result in the pro-
cessing of different information about the alternatives and may thus yield 
different choices when the same alternatives are presented twice. These fluc-
tuations may also be responsible for less than perfect predictions. 
The aspect of different processing sequences was investigated intensively 
in a number of experiments. One experiment (Aschenbrenner, Albert, & 
Schmalhofer, 1984) tested the assumption of varying processing orders 
against the traditional value-fluctuation assumption for described alter-
natives. Four topic fields (vacation areas, car rentals, journal subscriptions, 
and university towns) were used. Two of these were used for named and two 
for described presentation in a balanced design. In order to assess relatively 
stable estimates of individual choice fluctuations (i.e., choice probabilities), 
36 choice pairs (all pairs of 9 alternatives) per topic field were presented to 8 
subjects repeatedly over 20 sessions with weekly intervals. Feature evalu-
ations and importance judgments were also elicited in every session. 
A l l subjects had some choice pairs (about lh to Vi) for which their choices 
varied. Also the resulting choice probabilities were inconsistent with more 
simple stochastic choice models such as the Bradley-Terry-Luce model 
(Luce, 1959), which assumes choice probabilities to be a simple function of 
the alternatives' overall values. One version of a C D C model assumes a con-
stant processing order for all sessions, but varying feature evaluations 
(Thurstone, 1927). The actual variations of the evaluations over sessions were 
used to estimate this fluctuation. Another version of the C D C model 
assumes constant evaluations—for each feature its average evaluation over 
the 20 sessions was used—but the sequence of processing dimensions was 
assumed to vary probabilistically (Albert, Schmalhofer, & Aschenbrenner, 
1983). The probability for selecting an initial dimension or the next dimen-
sion in a choice was assumed to be a certain monotone function of the 
dimensions' importance (see the scale considerations afterwards). The criti-
cal values were estimated separately for each subject, topic field, and C D C 
model so that the fit was maximized. 
Both C D C models predicted some choice variation for all subjects which 
covaried with the observed variation. Mode l fit was determined by calculat-
ing the average quadratic deviation between predicted choice probabilities 
and observed choice frequencies over al l pairs from a topic field for each 
subject separately. The predictions derived from the assumption of varying 
processing sequences fitted the subjects' choices more accurately (p < 0.002) 
than the predictions derived from the value-fluctuation assumption in 14 out 
of 16 cases (8 subjects X 2 topic fields). 
Thus the order of processing information and its variation appears to play 
a substantial role i n choice processes. Consequently, this subprocess was 
analyzed i n more detail i n further experiments. 
In order to observe the selection of dimensions and the fluctuation d i -
rectly, experiments were run in which dimensions' names were presented 
while keeping the alternatives' features on the dimensions covered. Subjects 
had to select a dimension when they wanted to see the alternatives' features 
on that dimension. This procedure allows for direct observation of the sub-
ject's process of selecting information so that it is not necessary to rely on 
overall model fit, since assumptions about the selection process can be tested 
directly. The assumption that the selection process may be described pro-
babilistically by Luce's choice axiom was investigated; that is, that the prob-
ability pu for choosing a dimension i from the choice set / of dimensions is 
jej 
The choice axiom has the important property that the dimension para-
meters are invariant under different sets of dimensions. Naturally the 
choice set should consist of the dimensions/not yet inspected, since the mul-
tiple inspection of the same dimension may be considered as uneconomical. 
In this case the choice axiom provides a very parsimonious principle of 
selecting dimensions, since the dimensions' parameters s, remain constant 
for the successively smaller sets of dimensions. If the choice axiom holds 
(which is usually not the case for choices between multidimensional alter-
natives; Luce, 1977), the objects in question—in our case the d i m e n s i o n s -
may be ordered along a continuum. According to the previously described 
considerations the continuum should reflect the dimensions' importance. 
Direct scaling of the dimensions' importance by an adequate judgment pro-
cedure should result i n importance values having a monotone relationship 
with the indirectly obtained scale values of the choice axiom, provided that 
the choice axiom adequately represents the selection process, and that im-
portance judgments obtained by the direct-scaling procedure depend on the 
same underlying variable. 
In order to test these assumptions Aschenbrenner, Bdckenholt, Albert, and 
Schmalhofer (1986) reanalyzed data from two experiments. In both ex-
periments 15 binary choice tasks consisted of choosing a 1-year subscription 
to a news magazine. Whi le a display board always revealed the names of the 
11. dimensions (see Table 3-1) by which the alternatives were described, the 
features of a choice pair on the dimensions had to be successively requested 
by opening small doors until the subject wanted to make a choice. A d -
ditionally, the subjects judged the dimensions importance on a 7-point rat-
ing scale. 
The Sj parameters were estimated individually from each subjects' 15 or-
ders of inspecting dimensions by an iterative maximum likelihood algo-
rithm described by van Putten (1982). Two likelihood-ratio tests were per-
formed. First, the choice axiom with the estimated parameters (the fitted 
model) against the unrestricted model which reproduces the data perfectly 
was tested. Second, an even more restricted model assuming equal sf values 
for all dimensions against the fitted choice model was tested. The latter 
assumption of equal sf values for the choice model was rejected for 46 out of 
49 subjects while the fitted model was accepted for all but 1 subject. This 
demonstrates that the assumptions of the choice axiom and of the fitted 
parameters are meaningful since both could have been violated. 
With respect to the relation between judged importance and importance 
inferred from the choice axiom, the results were less conclusive. Although we 
obtained positive correlations between the s, values and the importance 
ratings for most of the subjects in both experiments, they were not high 
enough for the consideration of both variables as indicators of the same un-
derlying variable or for considering one variable as some form of validation 
for the other. A n underlying cause might have been that a rating procedure 
for the elicitation of importance judgments is far from being optimal when 
the required ratio-scale level is considered. 
Thus, another study was performed (Aschenbrenner, Bflckenholt, et al., 
1986, experiment 3) using magnitude estimation for eliciting importance 
judgments. Two groups with different payment of 20 subjects each had to 
choose between pairs of new board games described on 8 dimensions. This 
experiment used a pair comparison procedure for observing dimensional 
selection, that is, only two dimensions at at time were offered. After inspect-
ing the alternatives' features on one of the two dimensions, the subjects were 
allowed to choose one of the two alternatives or to select another dimension 
from a new pair of dimensions. They had to make a choice by the time they 
came to the last dimension. Choosing between pairs of alternatives was con-
tinued until each of the 28 possible pairs of dimensions had been offered at 
least 20 times in order to gather sufficiently stable estimates of the dimen-
sions' selection probabilities. 
After the choices the dimensions' importance was evaluated by applying a 
direct scaling procedure, namely a magnitude estimation procedure. Sub-
jects first rank ordered the eight dimensions and then had to judge how 
much more important each dimension was as compared to the least impor-
tant dimension. 
The Sj values were estimated individually from the pairwise dimensional 
selection data by maximum likelihood. The probabilities of the observed 
selection frequencies under the assumption of the choice axiom and the es-
timated parameters were calculated. These probabilities resembled the ex-
pected values very well, thus indicating the appropriateness of the choice 
axiom and the s, parameters. 
The individual subjects' rank correlations between the estimated values 
and the judged importance values w, were generally high, with medians of 
0.88 and 0.94 in the two groups of subjects. If both s, and u>, values are 
measures of the same underlying importance continuum and the assump-
tions about their scale levels are fulfilled, the logarithms of the values of the 
two scales should be linearly related. Usually, the s, values are considered to 
have ratio-scale level, whereas magnitude estimates are assumed to have a 
log-interval-scale level (e.g., Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971, pp. 164-
166). Indeed we found the product-moment correlations between log (si) and 
log (Wj) generally higher than those between s, and w„ log (si) and wh and sf 
and log (u>,); thus supporting the hypothesis. Examples for the log (si) and log 
(Wj) relationship are presented in Figure 3-2. 
Taken together, since the widely recognized assumption of sequential in -
formation processing was supported by global model tests, we presupposed 
sequential information processing for dimensionally described alternatives 
in order to make the processing observable with the aid of appropriate 
techniques. Thus data supporting two assumptions could be collected: (1) the 
variation in information selection can be described probabilistically in 
agreement with Luce's choice axiom, and (2) the estimated-scale values of 
the dimensions are closely related to the directly elicited subjective impor-
tances of the same dimensions. Both the scale values and importance 
judgments may be considered as indicators of the same latent variable. In 
our interpretation, the latent variable that orders the dimensions determines 
the subjectively expected amount of information about the alternatives and 
their features with respect to the specific choice task. Thus we are now able to 
investigate which factors determine the ordering of the dimension along the 
latent variable in a specific choice situation for an individual with certain 
objectives, values, and knowledge. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a technique for observing information re-
trieval from memory for named alternatives in the same direct manner as for 
described alternatives. However, there are some indications that the sequen-
tial process of information retrieval can also be described approximately in 
probabilistic ways (e.g., Albert, 1968; Shiffrin, 1970), though only for features 
and not for dimensions. 
In addition, another difference must be considered. For described alter-
natives we postulated that each dimension is processed only once; thus we 
assume probabilistic selection without replacement. However, for named 
alternatives we need to assume probabilistic retrieval of features with at least 
partial replacement, as shown in the previously established models of recall 
and continuous association in their comparison with models without re-
placement (Albert & Schulz, 1976). By replacement of features it is meant 
that the choice set in memory may remain the same during the choice pro-
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Figure 3-2. Sample plots of the log (st) - log (w,) relation for four subjects of experi-
ment 3 in Aschenbrenner, BGckenholt, Albert, & Schmalhofer (1986), with per-
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Figure 3-2. (Continued) 
cess and that an already processed feature may be selected again. Although 
this may be time-consuming it does not necessarily influence the choice, 
since reprocessing of a feature does not necessarily mean reevaluation. 
Final ly , there is the problem that association sequences to pairs of alter-
natives (during choice) are inferred from association sequences to single 
alternatives (during elicitation). Thus the temporal order of the retrieved 
features of an alternative should be independent of whether or not other 
features of a different alternative are in the retrieval set. Support for this 
assumption is provided by Albert and Schulz (1981), who demonstrated that 
the choice axiom still holds for simultaneous reproduction from two or more 
lists that were separately learned. 
Nevertheless, the influence of other factors, especially semantic ones, 
should not be disregarded in memory retrieval. Therefore, the retrieval of 
features does not only depend on the corresponding memory or retrieval 
strength of the feature, but also on the specific features that have been re-
trieved before. It should also be noted that such semantic factors can play a 
role in addition to their importance in the selection of externally presented 
dimension names. This effect might not have been discovered i n our data 
because we tried to use semantically and functionally unrelated dimensions 
for describing the alternatives. Thus other factors may influence the selec-
tion sequence in addition to the choice axiom, which may be considered as a 
good first approximation. 
Evaluation and Aggregation 
The general model and the global model tests (Table 3-2) that were pre-
viously mentioned include assumptions about the evaluation and aggre-
gation for both named and described alternatives: The often used differen-
tiation between cardinal and ordinal values and comparisons is made 
(Svenson, 1979). In either case, a counter or summation operation—as in 
many choice heuristics—is assumed as an aggregation rule. The cardinal 
models require a higher (interval) scale level than the ordinal model variants 
for the cognitively aggregated as well as for the separately assessed attractive-
ness values. Whether this scale level can be obtained for the attractiveness 
ratings is doubtful, as demonstrated by results obtained with Orth's (1979, 
1982) method (Laier, Albert, Schmalhofer, & Aschenbrenner, 1986). O n the 
other hand, the percentages of correctly predicted choices i n our studies were 
usually higher for cardinal than for ordinal models. This also holds for the 
modified version with stochastic dimensional selection. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that the attractiveness ratings contain more than ordinal 
information. 
For dimensionally described alternatives we may again try to take advan-
tage of the possibility of observing dimensional selection for directly testing 
hypotheses concerning the evaluation and aggregation component. In an 
unpublished experiment, subjects first rank ordered the dimensions accord-
ing to importance and rated the features' attractiveness values. One to two 
days later we presented successively each dimension's name together with 
the features of two alternatives in the order of judged importance. After each 
presented dimension the subject had to make a tentative choice specifying 
which of the alternatives he would now choose. 
Thirteen subjects participated in this experiment. The choice areas were 
vacation places in August and news magazine subscriptions. The subjects 
had to choose between 6 alternatives, that is, 15 choice pairs, for each choice 
area. By aggregating the rated attractiveness values in the same order as the 
features on the 11 dimensions were presented to the subjects, we were able to 
predict about 85% of the tentative choices correctly. 
O f special interest are those cases where the subjects changed their tenta-
tive choice during a choice process. This occurred in 214 out of the 1949 ob-
served tentative choices. If the modeled variations of the countervalue corre-
spond to the subjective oscillations between the alternatives, then tentative 
choice changing should occur only i f the counter changes correspondingly. 
The last two rows of Table 3-5 (a) confirm this correspondence (the 41 choice 
shifts that were accompanied by no change in the counter value may be due 
to the subjects discriminating finer than the 7-point rating scale allowed). 
However, a similar result would be expected i f the subjects would not 
aggregate evaluation differences over dimensions at all but choose only on 
the basis of the last dimension they see. The first two rows of Table 3-5 (a) 
Table 3-5. (a) Changes in the Counter and Shifts in Tentative Choices; 
(b) Attractiveness Differences and Preference Judgments 
Tentative 
Choice3 
Counter Changes Toward 
No Change X Y 
Remains X 
Y 
Changes X to Y 
from Y to X 
324 
312 
24 
17 
368 
198 
5 
94 
239 
294 
70 
4 
(a) 
Alternative 
Judged to 
Be Better3 
Difference on Dimension Toward 
No Difference X Y 
Remains X 
Y 
Changes X to Y 
from Y to X 
195 
204 
151 
121 
298 
31 
22 
294 
37 
279 
283 
24 
(b) 
aMissing values are due to simultaneous pressing of two response buttons. 
show that this is not the case. There are many cases in which the currently 
presented dimension favored the alternative that is not preferred. Actually, 
there are so many such cases (437) that one might develop the opposite suspi-
cion that the subjects did not care about the given information but simply 
stuck to their choices. To rule out this possibility a third session one or two 
days later was similarly run. In this session the subjects were instructed to in -
dicate which alternative was preferred on the currently presented dimension. 
The results i n Table 3-5 (b) show a completely different pattern, thus ruling 
out both alternative explanations. 
Again, there are also many changes in the judgments without correspond-
ing attractiveness differences. These may be explained by the comparison 
procedure used, in which subjects were able to discriminate between the 
features' attractiveness when they were presented together. However, due to 
the small number of categories of the absolute judgment scale, they assigned 
equal values to these features. 
Thus the evaluation differences obtained by the comparative judgments 
do not always coincide with the evaluation differences calculated from the 
absolute judgments, that is, attractiveness ratings. This observation is again 
related to the question concerning the reliability of the ratings and the fluc-
tuation of the implicit attractiveness evaluations. 
The rating data of Aschenbrenner, Albert, & Schmalhofer (1984) were 
reanalyzed with respect to the consistency of the subjects' attractiveness 
judgments. The product-moment correlations for these data are presented in 
Table 3-6 for intervals between 1 and 19 weeks. 
The results are in the usual range for rating data; the consistencies in -
crease with shorter intervals as expected. In most of our studies the time in -
tervals were considerably shorter than one week, since the ratings and the 
choices were often collected in the same experimental session. Although we 
may consider the consistency of a subject to be higher within one meeting 
than after a one-week interval, we cannot rule out the possibility that values 
still fluctuate in this situation. It should be possible to recognize the in -
fluence of such value fluctuations i f the sequence of processed information is 
known. Therefore we looked for differences between the 80% correctly pre-
dicted and the 20% incorrectly predicted choices of an experiment in which 
the subjects had to uncover the information about the alternatives sequen-
tially (Schmalhofer, Albert, Aschenbrenner, & Gertzen, 1986). 
The incorrect choice predictions do not necessarily indicate a structural 
difference between the model predictions and the observed data. Instead, the 
deviations might be explained by inaccuracies in the empirically assessed at-
tractiveness ratings. While the average attractiveness difference for the cor-
rectly predicted choices is clearly in favor of the chosen alternative (1.09), the 
respective differences favor the rejected alternatives only slightly (mean = 
0.40) for incorrect predictions. If the attractiveness evaluations determine the 
choice, the preferred alternative should receive higher mean attractiveness 
evaluations than the rejected one. If this statement is val id for the choices not 
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predicted by the model, and i f attractiveness evaluations also determine the 
ratings, then the attractiveness values obtained by the rating procedure may 
not be identical to the attractiveness values at the time of the choice. This 
may lead to incorrectly predicted choices, particularily for choice pairs with 
small attractiveness differences. 
Termination and Choice 
The majority of choice models are based on the assumption of complete or at 
least constant information processing. Hence these choice rules are not able 
to predict systematic choice latency differences or differences in the amount 
of processed information. Some choice heuristics are able to do this, for ex-
ample, the lexicographic rule, the elimination by aspect rule and the C D C 
rule. According to the C D C model, the choice process is terminated as soon 
as the accumulated attractiveness values or value differences reach or exceed 
a criterion in favor of one of the alternatives. Consequently, the amount of 
information required for a choice is dependent on the actually occurring at-
tractiveness values or differences, and on the order in which these values or 
differences occur. 
The model predicts the number of processing steps for a single choice of a 
person with known or estimated processing order, attractiveness values, and 
critical value. Although the time for each processing step may vary, a positive 
correlation is to be expected between the predicted numbers of processing 
steps and the observed choice latencies. However, the size of the positive cor-
relation cannot be specified, since individual latency times are usually not 
very reliable. The correlation of choice latencies with a test-retest interval of 
one week has been found to be .26 and .30 for choices between named alter-
natives, and .15 and .24 for choices between described alternatives (Schmal-
hofer et al., submitted). In addition, due to the previously mentioned consis-
tency and estimation problems, the C D C model cannot perfectly predict the 
number of processing steps even i f the model provides a val id representation. 
However, we may conclude from significantly positive correlations that the 
C D C model is superior to other models that assume that the amount of i n -
formation is the same during choices (of the same type and from the same 
area). Assuming deterministic processing orders we found a correlation of 
0.23 (or 0.12 for only those choices that were not used to estimate the critical 
values) for named alternatives using free-association data. Fo r described 
alternatives we obtained correlations of -0.07 (-0.09) and 0.05 (0.14) when 
deterministic orders processing by importance were assumed (Schmalhofer 
et al., submitted). Both stochastic models, the stochastic dimension selection, 
and the value fluctuation model yielded higher correlations between the pre-
dicted number of processing steps and choice latencies. Out of 32 tau-
correlations 29 were positive; the medians were 0.49 (subject generated alter-
natives) and 0.67 (experimenter generated alternatives) for the value-
fluctuation model, 0.40 and 0.38 for the stochastic-dimension-selection 
model (Aschenbrenner et al., 1984). If one explains the missing positive cor-
relation for described alternatives in the deterministic case with the finding 
that the processing orders vary randomly, the results are acceptable. 
Again, described alternatives allow direct observation of the number of 
processed dimensions or features using the technique of sequentially un-
covering information. According to our observations, the number of pro-
cessed dimensions varies from choice to choice for about 75% of our subjects 
(21 out of 28 subjects in experiments 1, 33 out of 42 subjects in experiment 2 
in Schmalhofer et al., 1986). 
According to the C D C model, the number of processed dimensions 
should increase with the similarity between choice alternatives. By def-
init ion, more similar alternatives have more features that are similar or 
even identical. Processing of the respective dimensions adds little or no 
attractiveness difference to the counter. Consequently, more dimensions 
must be processed before one of the critical values is reached and the proc-
ess is terminated. The more similar two alternatives are, and the more 
identical features they have, the more dimensions should be inspected and 
processed on the average. This was found by Schmalhofer et al. (1986; Figure 
2; experiment 1) to be true. Figures 3-3 (a) and 3-3 (b) present the respective 
new results of the two conditions (without and with consequences) of experi-
ment 2 from Schmalhofer et al., which replicated the results of experi-
ment 1. 
The C D C models postulate termination and choice when the aggregated 
attractiveness values favoring one or the other alternative reach or exceed 
one of two corresponding criteria. A testable consequence of this assumption 
is that the most extreme counter value—taken absolutely—should always 
occur in the last processing step. Otherwise one criterion would have been 
reached earlier, and thus the choice process would have been terminated 
earlier. The technique of sequential uncovering allows the observation of the 
specific dimensions inspected and their sequence. Thus the counter value 
may be calculated from the attractiveness ratings for all processing steps and 
should be highest for the last dimension being processed. If, however, ter-
mination and choice were independent of reaching any criterion, the most 
extreme counter value could occur with equal probability at any of the ob-
served processing steps. The prediction of the C D C model is tested here for 
the data of experiment 2 from Schmalhofer et al. (1986). 
The clear bars in Figure 3-4 show how often (over all choice pairs and sub-
jects) the most extreme counter value was observed in the last, next to last, 
and so on processing step. The striped bars show the frequencies that would 
be expected under the assumption of independent termination (they also dif-
fer in height due to varying numbers of inspected dimensions). The distribu-
tion of the observed counter values rejects the null-hypothesis that termina-
tion occurs independently of size of the counter value and favors the 
prediction of the C D C model, thus replicating former findings (Schmalhofer 
et al., 1986; experiment 1). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10 11 
Number of Dimensions 
(a) 
Figure 3-3. Cumulative frequency distributions of the number of inspected dimen-
sions for three classes of choice pairs: (a) without and (b) with choice consequences. 
Comparison with Other Models 
In order to examine whether the C D C models are good candidates for mod-
eling the process of choice for named and described alternatives, our 
research mainly focused on consequences specific to these models. Recently, 
a model comparison was performed. The predictions of different models 
able to predict binary choices must necessarily overlap to a considerable ex-
tent. Even i f the predictions of two models would be made randomly, for ex-
ample, by flipping two coins, both would correctly predict about 50% of the 
choices; thus a choice rule should predict substantially better. We would pre-
fer that choice rule with the maximum number of correct predictions, in spite 
of the prediction overlap. Thus 15 more or less well-known choice rules that 
are able to handle binary choices were applied to the data provided by 
Schmalhofer et al. (1986; experiment 1; described alternatives, uncovering of 
features) by Albert, Aschenbrenner, Engemann, Radtke, Sachs, and Schmal-
hofer (submitted). Out of the 15 rules, 4 were variants of the C D C models. 
The most successful (78.57% correct predictions) of these C D C variants was 
again the cardinal C D C model applied with known sequences of informa-
tion processing and estimating the critical values independently of the 
choices. The majority rule (70.48%), weightpro rule (77.38%) and the lexico-
agraphic rule (72.14%) also predicted over 70% correctly; the additive utility 
rule was even more successful than the best C D C variant with 79.05% correct 
predictions. However, only the C D C rule and, as submodel of it, the lex-
icographic rule allows for selective and adaptive information processing. 
While the other successful rules—including the additive utility rule—assume 
processing of the same dimensions for all pairs of alternatives. However, by 
observing the uncovered feature pairs we can clearly rule out this assump-
tion, thus again questioning the percentage of correct predictions as the only 
criterion for model evaluation and favoring the C D C model in comparison 
to other models. 
Alternative Based Aggregation into Holistic Evaluations 
or Attitudes? 
According to the results discussed in the prior section, the additive utility 
model predicts choices very well, whereas other observations demonstrate 
violations of its processing assumptions. This clearly supports our initial 
too 
J I 1*3 J Z L 
Last First 
Dimensions In Backward Processing Order 
Figure 3-4. Frequency distributions of the maximum counter values for the 11 
dimensions in backward processing order. Clear columns are the observed frequen-
cies, striped columns are the frequencies that are predicted under the assumption of 
the null hypothesis. 
scepticism about Ajzen and Fishbeins (1980) and Fishbein and Ajzens 
(1975) results when interpreted as indicating characteristics of the choice 
process. 
It might be argued, however, that many choices are not made between 
alternatives presented simultaneously, and that for alternatives presented se-
quentially an alternative based aggregation into holistic evaluations or at-
titudes with a subsequent comparison of these holistic evaluations may be 
more convenient (Tversky, 1969). This hypothesis has been investigated with 
described alternatives (text processing systems) by Schmalhofer and Gertzen 
(1986). In principle, the study adopted the evaluation part and the binary 
choice part for described alternatives with the following additional indepen-
dent variation: the two alternatives of a choice pair were presented (1) 
simultaneously, (2) sequentially, or (3) sequentially with an interfering task 
in-between. By this variation, dimensional comparisons were made pro-
gressively more difficult, thus suggesting the use of alternative based process-
ing strategies. Each description was presented together with the respective 
alternative's fictitious name. After the choice tasks, the subjects gave holistic 
evaluative judgments on a 9-point rating scale regarding the alternatives pre-
sented by names without the descriptions (memory judgments) and about 
the alternatives presented by their descriptions without the names (regular 
judgments). 
If subjects base their decisions on holistic judgments, these should be in-
cidentally learned by the subjects while choosing and then stored in 
memory. The memory judgments should therefore agree with the choices 
and with the holistic regular judgments of the descriptions. 
The results (Table 3-7) indicate that for both of the two agreement scores a 
stronger tendency toward an alternative based processing strategy exists for 
sequential presentation; the tendency is even stronger for sequential presen-
tation with an interpolated task between alternatives. However, the agree-
ment scores were lower than expected. Therefore, a replication study has 
been performed by Gertzen and Schmalhofer (1986), the results of which are 
presented in Table 3-8. 
The range of the agreement scores reappeared on a global level; but the ex-
pected increase of the agreement scores over conditions could not be 
replicated, thus questioning the previously discussed interpretation. In order 
to get more insight into the processing of information, a think-aloud study 
was performed for the sequential presentation condition using Schmalhofer 
and Schafer's (1986) C D C model based category system including an overall 
judgment category. The results from 120 binary choices (Table 3-9) show that 
there was indeed a substantial amount of overall judgments (104 utterances), 
namely for approximately each second alternative (of the 240 alternatives 
presented). There was also a considerable amount of dimensional processing 
(96 utterances) which was only possible when the second alternative was 
available and which obviously reduced alternative based processing of the 
second alternative. 
The results do indicate, however, that subjects may use dimensional as 
well as alternative based processing in choosing between sequentially pre-
sented alternatives. 
For simultaneous presentation of alternatives, think-aloud data of 
Schmalhofer and Schafer (1986) indicate some amount of holistic evaluation 
Table 3-7. Relative Frequency of Correct Choice Predictions by Judgments 
from Memory, and Correlations Between Judgments from Memory and 
Regular Judgments 
Presentation of Alternatives 
Simultaneous Sequential With Interpolation Task 
Predictions 
Correlations 
.54 .65 .73 
.22 .27 .35 
From Schmalhofer & Gertzen (1986), with permission. 
Table 3-8. Relative Frequency of Correct Choice Predictions by Judgments 
from Memory, and Correlations Between Judgments from Memory and 
Regular Judgments 
Presentation of Alternatives 
Simultaneous Sequential With Interpolation Task 
Predictions 
Correlations 
.71 .63 .69 
.25 .23 .36 
From Gertzen & Schmalhofer (1986), with permission. 
for named alternatives (15% of utterances), while almost none for described 
alternatives (2% of utterances). 
Taken together, alternative based aggregation rules in the sense of Ajzen 
and Fishbein may be used under some conditions for more than some 
choices, but as a general rule this was not found for binary choice; con-
tradicting Ajzen and Fishbein's reasoning. 
General Discussion 
As argued at the start of this chapter, Fishbein and Ajzen consider their 
theory of reasoned action as a process model for the prediction of various 
kinds of behavioral choices. Models of this k ind are indeed well suited for 
the prediction of choices, as is also shown by our data. The processes that 
precede behavioral choice are, nevertheless, inadequately described by mod-
els of the Fishbein and Ajzen type. A t least for binary choice the C D C mod-
els appear more appropriate. Each individual finding that supports the pro-
cess assumptions of the C D C models may be subject to alternative 
Table 3-9. Percentages of Four Different Verbalizations and a Rest Category for 
the First and Second Presented Choice Alternative3 
Alternative 
First Second Total 
Single features 43% 23% 70% 
Dimensional comparisons — 11% 11% 
Overall judgments 7% 5% 12% 
Mentioning of dimensions 1% 1% 2% 
Rest category 1% 4% 5% 
From Gertzen & Schmalhofer (1986), with permission. 
aFor 120 analyzed choice trials, the total number of verbalizations was 870. 
interpretation. But taken jointly the empirical evidence appears to support 
the C D C models considerably. 
We do not claim the same degree of universality for the C D C models as 
was done with the theory of reasoned action and its successors. The follow-
ing are our reasons for this belief. 
1. Thus far the C D C models have been tested solely in the laboratory. 
F ie ld tests are still under way. Currently, the theory is applied to delivery 
choices of pregnant women. But even such (hopefully) successful ap-
plications wil l probably not result in the replacement of former prediction 
models by the C D C models. It is doubtless that the C D C models are well 
suited for prediction whenever they describe the underlying processes. 
However, the effort that is required for the assessment and estimation of the 
model parameters wi l l usually not be justified i f prediction is the sole 
objective. 
2. U p to now C D C models have been designed and tested solely for 
binary-forced choice. We do not expect the same processes for all other kinds 
of behavioral choice. Rather, it is to be expected that further variations in the 
choice situation wil l influence the process components in similar ways, as 
was shown for the variation of presentation modes. For example, the latter 
variation from named to described presentation influenced the subprocess 
of information selection, whereas other subprocesses remained the same. 
Generally, we suggest that cognitive choice processes adapt their com-
ponents flexibly to task as well as to situational characteristics. 
This selectivity and adaptivity of cognitive choice processes has two conse-
quences for the attitude-behavior relationship: (1) The principles that un-
derlie this adaptation performance should be studied more thoroughly. (2) 
The more basic processes of evaluation which, as we see it, are basic to all 
cognitive choice processes should be studied more thoroughly. 
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